This paper suggests that adverse selection problems in competitive annuity markets can generate quantity constrained equilibria in which some agents whose length of' lifetime is uncertain find it advantageous to accumulate capital privately.
1.

Introduction
This paper investigates the nature of annuity markets and the composition of private portfolios when there exists cx ante private information regarding individual specific survival probabilities. The existence of such private information leads to equilibrium annuity contracts which constrain subsets of agents with respect to the quantity of annuities that they can purchase. When the magnitude of agents' investments in some non-annuity type asset is non-observable, these quantity constraints may be sufficiently binding to lead sane agents who do not have bequest motives to finance a portion of their old age consumption via bequeathable wealth. This can occur despite the fact that the equilibrium rate of return on bequeathable wealth is lower than the equilibrium rate of return on annuities • Given uncertain lifetimes, the voluntary private accumulation of bequeathable wealth generates involuntary bequests.
In contrast to Kotlikoff and Spivak (1981) , Abel (1985) and Eckatein, Eichenbaum and Peled (1985a) , emong others, who exclude annuity markets on an a riori basis, the quantity constraints on purchases of annuities in our model emerge as an equilibrium response to adverse selection problems.
The explicit derivation of the nature of equilibrium annuity contracts allows us to identify the types of agents who will be quantity-constrained with respect to annuity purchases. In addition we are able to discuss the welfare properties of decentralized equilbria in our adverse selection economy.
Given a characterization of the set of informationally constrained Pareto optimal allocations, we briefly discuss a welfare improving role for government when involuntary bequests exist. This does not reflect any belief on our part that bequest motives do not play an important role in generating intergenerational transfers.
Instead, this assumption is made for convenience and because the qualitative features of our results will be robust to the inclusion of standard types of bequest motives (see for example Barro (1974) , Shezhinski and Weiss (1981) and Abel (1984) ). It is true that if agents had bequest motives, not all intergenerational transfers would be involuntary. However some individuals would still be quantity-constrained with respect to annuity purchases so that some personal consumption would be financed from bequeathable wealth. Put somewhat differently, bequeathable wealth uld not be held solely for bequest purposes • This is consistent with findings by Diamond and Hausman (1982) , King and Dicks-Mirseaux (1982) , Bernheim (1984) and Bernheim, Shleifer and Sunmers (1985) which imply that retired people dissave from non-annuity type assets in order to finance their consumption. Such behavior is inconsistent with models in which agents can purchase, without quantity constraints, actuarially fair annuities, regardless of whether or not they have standard types of bequest motives.
The remainder of this paper is organized as followe. In section 2 we present the basic features of the model. Decentralized equilibria are discussed in section 3 while welfare considerations and the policy implications of our results are analyzed in section 4. Finally, section 5 contains some concluding remarks.
2.
The Model
The population is partitioned into two distinct groups, A and B. For each type A agent there are r type B agents, y > 0. The members of each group live at most two periods, the first of which they survive with certainty. Death can occur at the beginning of the second period with probability h £ {A,B}, o < A < B < 1. With a continuum of agents, a proportion (lIIh) of the old members of group h will die at the beginning of the second period. Throughout, we assume that the survival probability of iy given agent is known only by the agent in question.
Thus *iile each agent correctly perceives that his probability of dying at the beginning of the second period is (luh), h £ (A,B}, he does not know thether any other given agent is a member of group A or B.
Let denote the consumption of a type h agent in period i, hc{A,B}, i a 1,2. We assume that is zero if the agent is not alive in period 2.
Preferences over lifetime consumption (C,C) of a type h agent are given by U(C) + IhU(C), Since TB> it folloi that qB(e1,e2) > qA(ee) for all (e1,e2) c with strict inequality whenever qB(e,e) > 0. Agents' indirect utilities defined over (e1,e2), to be denoted by '(','), are defined as Vh(e1, e2) U(e1 -qh(e1,e2)] + IIhU(e2
Given these definitions we proceed now to describe the competitive equilbrit.mi of this economy.
Competitive Annuity Markets
In this section we consider the competitive provision of annuities in the economy described above.
In doing this we utilize two related concepts of equilibrium in adverse selection environments due to Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) and Wilson (1977) . Competition ong annuity providers involves the specification of both "prices" and "quantities" in the sense discussed by Rothschild and Stiglitz and Wilson.2 Under both of the definitions of an equilibrium which we consider, an annuity contract is viewed as a two-dimensional vector (S,R) where S denotes the premium paid in the first period of a purchaser's life and SR is the corresponding return to the agent if he is alive in the second period.
We define L.h(SIR) = MaxIU(W..S-q) + nU(RS+dq)}, h c (A,B} (3.1) q>0 as the indirect utility that a member of group h derives from the annuity contract (S,R), taking into account his optimal non-insurance portfolio decisions.
A Rothschild/Stigj.itz (El) equilibrium is a set of contracts such that (1) agents choose contracts and non-insurance assets to maximize their expected utility; (ii) all contracts in the equilibrium set earn zero profits; (iii) there is no contract outside the equilibrium set that is preferred by some agent and which makes non-negative expected profits when offered by one firm under the assumption that the set of contracts offered by other firms remains unchanged.
A Wilson (E2) equilibrium is the seme as the El equilibrium except that firms' expectations are modified by assuming that each firm will correctly anticipate which of those policies that are offered by other firms will become unprofitable as a consequence of any changes in its own policies.
The firm then offers a new policy only if it makes non-negative profits after all the other firms have maie the expected adjustment in their policy offers.
It is convenient to divide annuity contract equilibria into one of two catagories, (a) pooling equilibria in which all agents buy the seme annuity contract, and (b) separating equilibria in which agents with different survival probabilities purchase different annuity contracts. We begin by noting that, as in standard adverse selection insurance contexts, there does not exist an El pooling equilibrium.3 Consequently, if an El equilibrium exists, it is a separating one. Since each contract offered must earn zero profit, each group's contract is actuarially fair in the sense that its rate of return equals 61h' h c {A,B}.
The fact that some agents may choose to finance second period consumption by holding bequeathable wealth follows from the nature of the equilibrium annuity contracts. In particular, as Theorem 1 indicates, the competitive provision of annuities guarantees that agents with high survival probabilities will not be constrained regarding annuity purchases. However, agents with low survival probabilities may be sufficiently constrained with respect to annuity purchases that they find it advantageous to hold capital as veil as annuities, despite the fact that capital is dominated with respect to its rate of return. The set of El equilibrium contracts is affected in an important way by the possibility of unobservable capital accumulation by agents.
Specifically, group B's incentive cpatibility constraint must reflect the fact that the members of that group can invest in capital as well as buy the group A annuity contract. As a result, the possibility of unobservable capital accumulation may make the members of group A worse off without affecting the welfare of the members of group B. This possibility is depicted in Figure 1 . When the capital technology is unavailable to private agents, the El separating equilibrium consists of the contracts defined by points B and G.
These are given by Theorem 1 assuming that q(,') 0. bwever, when agents of type B wish to store privately from allocation G, the equilibrium contracts are given by points B and H.
The point H corresponds to the group A equilibrium annuity contract that solves problem 2 of Theorem 1 • The allocation H has the property that if a member of group B optimally invested from that point, Let (SG,/IIA) and denote the annuity contracts corresponding to the points G and H respectively. While the annuity contract for group B specifies that group's rina]. allocation, this is not necessarily the case for group A, since q&(W...SH,SH6/u) may be positive.
Hence, because of quantity rationing in the group A equilibrium annuity contract, the members of that group may hold positive quantities of t distinct assets, one of which has a higher rate of return from their point of view. This possibility is depicted in Figure 1 , where the members of group A attain the allocation H' by storing privately from H. Put differently, the members of group A may hold capital and annuities even in the absence of bequest motives.
Until now our discussion has assumed that an El equilibrium exists.
The following theorem, which is proved in Appendix B, provides necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of an El equilibrium. Theorem 2 Let (Ci,C) denote the consumption allocation chosen by consumer A if he must buy the contract (SA,6/TA) which solves problem 2 of Theorem 1.
An El equilibrium does not exist if and only if A's indifference curve throih (Ci',C) intersects the budget line C1 + c2/! : W, where is the economy-wide actuarially fair rate of return given by = Theorem 2 implies that the existence of an El equilibrium is made more tenuous by agents' ability to privately store capital. This follows from the fact that the condition mentioned in Theorem 2 is more likely to be satisfied the rse is the initial position of the members of group A.
The possibility of private capital accumulation has precisely this adverse effect on the incentive compatible annuity contract for group A.
As Wilson (1977) has shown, the E2 equilibrium concept complements the Rothschild-Stigljtz El concept in the following my: when the economy is one for which an El equilibrium exists, it is also the E2 equilibrium; when the El equilibrium does not exist, the £2 equilibrium contract is a pooling one which, in our context, solves Max U(W_3_q1(W_S,S)) + U(S!+IsqP(W_S,S))
where is the economy-wide actuarially fair rate of return (defined in Theorem 2).
Since the choice of S is unconstrained (aside from the non-negativity condition), the solution to (3.14), denoted Si', has the property that q5!,5) = 0. Since qB(5P5P) > qA(5P5P), group B may store positive amounts of the consumption good in an E2 pooling equilibriii. This is to be contrasted with the separating equilibrium in which the members of group A, but not the members of group B, may engage in private storage.
The result that agents who do not have bequest motives may hold bequeathable wealth was derived under the assumptions that private storage activities and individual, survival probabilities are private information.
In order to validate our claim that involuntary bequests can be attributed to the unobservability of certain forms of bequeathable wealth, we now examine the equilibrium of our model under the alternative assumption that private holdings of capital are publicly observable. Under these circumstances one can condition the terms of an annuity contract on the level of capital held by the purchaser of the contract.
In genera], different levels of private capital held by agents will reveal their types. We assume therefore that the members of group B, the high risk group from the point of view of annuity issuers, will be offered the El group B equilibrium contract, which coincides with the full information group B contract, whenever their type is revealed. It follows that the members of group B will, always hold the same amount of capital as a member of group A when both purchase the same contract.
Consider first the situation in which bequeathable wealth is held in a E2 pooling equilibrium when private storage is unobservable. At the allocation which corresponds to th. annuity pooling contract,
represented by point F in Figure 2, Consider next the situation depicted in Figure 1 , in bthich the separating equilibrium with unobservable storage involves the holding of bequeathable wealth by the members of group A. In that equilibrium private holding of capital allows the members of group A to increase their utility by moving from allocation H to allocation H'. In order to be incentive compatible, the equilibrium group A annuity contract must have the property that the final group B allocation obtainable from it lies on the indifference curve (labelled 'B in Figure 1 ) passing through the group B annuity contract. Thus, when storage is observable, the binding constraint on group A's final allocation is that it lies along 13. Pareto optimal allocations are defined to be the solutions to particular types of social planning problems. The choice variables of these problems are referred to as type-specific handouts of t period consumption levels, and are denoted by (C', C), hc{A,B}. The important feature of this social planning problem is that the ability of private agents to accumulate capita]. in an unobserved manner prevents the social planner from specifying final consumption levels.
Assuming that first period endoirenents and the proceeds from stored output are the only sources of goods in the first and second periods respectively, the resource constraints on the choice variables, expressed iii) Incentive Cpatibility Constraint (4.4) by choice of tc1, C, C, C}.
We begin characterizing the solutions to Problem 3 by considering pooling allocations of the form C C = C,, j z 1,2. The following theorem, which is proved in Appendix C, characterizes the unique pooling allocation which can be Pareto optimal. Notice that condition (ii) of Theorem 3 implies that MRSh(11,22) = h'' hc{A,B}. Since < 1/6, he{A,B}, it follows that no agent will wish to store privately at the unique candidate for an optimal pooling allocation.
The following theorem, which is proved in Appendix D, states that no allocation which induces private storage is Pareto optimal. It follows that an equilibrium cannot be Pareto optimal if involtitary bequests are generated.
Since the members of group A may store privately in an El separating equilibrium and the members of group B may store privately in an E2 pooling equilibrium, neither of these equilibria will, in general, be Pareto optimal. Unlike the separating equilibrium which may be optimal if no private storage occurs an E2 pooling equilibrium never results in an optimal allocation regardless of whether or not individuals engage in private storage. By Theorem 3, a pooling allocation can be Pareto optimal only if it coincides with the (!1,Z2) allocation, which has the property that MRSh(!1,!2) = ha{A,B}. }bwever at the E2 pooling equilibrium, MRSA(C,C) = We first consider the case in which the equilibrium corresponding to I z 0 is an £2 pooling equilibrium, with pooling contract (#,ff) and qB(i_sP,sP) > 0. This situation is described in Figure 3 by the point , which corresponds to the equilibrium pooling annuity contract, and point B which corresponds to the final allocation attainable by the members of groi B by privat, storage from the point P.
Consider a mandatory annuity progrem with I = S. Figure 3 . Since this budget line represents a higher rate of return than the one used to obtain allocation B from the point P, the members of group B are clearly made better off. The indifference curve of type B agents through B' intersects the budget line of group A that passes through the point P (which has a slope of at G'. Notice that at B, U'(C) = so that it is necessarily the case that U'(C') < sSU'(C').
Thus G must lie on a higher indifference curve of group A than the one
passing through P.
Moreover, q (Cj ,C2 ) = 0 since MRS (9 ,C2
Next we consider the case in which the initial equilibrium lies above the set ((C1, C2)IU (C1) : &U (C2)}, MRZA(C. , C'j ) < 1/6. This establishes both that the members of group A are better off at (C' ,C') and that no private storage will be undertaken by those Involuntary bequests emerge as an equilibrium phenomenon because of the nature of the equilibrium annuity contracts in our model economy.
Two assumptions are quite important for our results • First, it must be the case that the issuers of annuities must be able to monitor the number of annuities purchased by any given agent. Secondly, it is critical for the existence of involuntary bequests that there be some forms of bequeathable wealth that are not observable to annuity issuers.
The importance of the first assumption can be seen by noting that it is a necessary condition for the existence of quantity constraints. In particular, the applicability of the Ibthschild and Stiglitz (1976) and Wilson (1977) definitions of competitivf equilibrium In adverse selection markets depend crucially on the monitorability of contracts. The role of the first assumption is highlighted in this paper by considering the equilibrium then this assumption is not true • ()ir results are consistent with other findings in the literature which indicate that the non-observability of private capital accumulation can change the nature of optimal contracts in fundanenta]. ways. For ezanple, Scheinloiian and Weiss (198$) consider a class of economic environments in rEiIch individually optimal savings and limited borrowing at market clearing interest rates completely exhaust the opportunities for feasible risk sharing anong agents with Idiosyncratic and privately observed income. These authors analyze a two period model in iIich agents have the possibility of saving (but not borrowing) at the sane rate as financial intermediaries and where the level of saving is not observed by financial intermediaries. Optimal contracts in this envirornnent involve letting agents borrow or lend at market interest rates, subject to the constraint that debt is limited to the maximun present value that an agent can repay in the second period with probability one. This is not the case hen the magnitude of private savings are observed by financial intermediaries.
We conclude by reiterating that the paper abstracts from the existence of bequest motives. This does not reflect any belief on ow part that bequest motives are unimportant in explaining the total magnitude of intergenerational transfers. The assumption that agents have no bequest motives is made only to simplify the analysis and because our qualitative results will not be affected by the presence of standard types of bequest motives. It is certainly true that the ratio of involuntary to voltmtary bequests will be affected by the existence of bequest motives. However, that ratio will not necessarily be zero as existing models of agents with izicertain length of lifetimes tho have access to actuarially fair annuity markets Imply. Put sewhat differently, se agents with bequest motives may continue to finance their oi future consumption by holdir se bequeathable wealth in their portfolios despite the existence of fully organized annuity markets.
The requirement that each contract earns zero profit implies group specific actuarially fair rates of return on each group's annuities.
We prove the rest of the theorem by contradiction. Suppose that The contract (S,) will therefore be purchased by members of group A if offered, and it will earn positive profits if they alone purchase it, and zero profits otherwise.
We now prove that if This is achieved by considering two exhaustive and mutually exclusive cases for private storage activities fr the contract q (W-.S 6/UA) > 0.
In order to offer a contract (S,R) that yields nonnegative profits and satisfies LACS,R) > LA(SA,6/UA) it must be that to Problem 3 in $.
Moreover, it can also be sho that If we let = (C-t,C+rc) then for any r > 0 there exists c > 0 such that satisfies aggregate consistency. Next we show that r and c can be chosen in an incentive compatible way to yield a strictly better allocation to agents of type B.
Pick an r such that MRSA(C,C) < hr < MRSB(C,C), and let 
